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NIKLAS LUHMANN, Law as a Social System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 498 
pp., ISBN 0–19–826238–8, £65.00. 
 
Despite the availability of sometimes brilliant English translations of many texts by the 
late German sociologist and legal theorist Niklas Luhmann, his influence on Anglo-
American theory continues to be minimal. In his version and elaboration of systems 
theory, Luhmann describes the collision of societal systems in an endless struggle not 
for coherence, but for interpenetration, co-existence and perturbation, operational 
closure and cognitive openness, not for ‘exit, voice and loyalty’, but for reflexive 
processes of irritation and co-evolution, not for regulatory competition versus 
harmonization, but for evolution and autopoeitic self-reproduction. These are key words 
that are central to Luhmann’s theoretical construction and on which Europeans may spend 
years of intellectual probing, convening conferences of extraordinary magnitude and 
exhausting intensity, where they show their grey faces sticking out of turtlenecks or tie-
less shirts while they drink black coffee; not much of this seems to be of great appeal to 
the Anglo-American world. 
Where can we look for reasons? Already the number of English language translations 
that are available of Luhmann’s œuvre should refute possible comparisons to another case 
of – at least in the beginning – scholarly disinterest in the English-speaking world in 
the work of Carl Schmitt, whose wide-ranging work has only more recently really been 
discovered in English. The comparison does not hold because Carl Schmitt eventually 
found his way into the debates in the English-speaking world, his work has been translated 
and he has become the target of symposia, conferences and major collections. Giorgio 
Agamben’s persistent inquiry into the ‘state of exception’ signalled a renewed interest in 
Schmitt’s work and influence on contemporary legal and political thinking, one that is 
again increasingly dominated by a normative thrust and a seemingly inevitable 
moralization of positions into either good or bad, friend or foe. Luhmann, in contrast, is 
 
regularly seen as disinterested, even incompatible to such universalizing legal-political 
discourse. Instead, his identification of society as consisting of communications that take 
place among scattered systems of consciousness, his pernicious insistence on the self-
referentiality of systems of meaning and the ensuing, hard-to-swallow, dire consequence of 
an exclusion of moral thinking from driving and determining learning processes seem to 
situate Luhmann’s concepts on the outside of most contemporary political and legal 
theory. A closer look at the admittedly overwhelming volume of Luhmann’s literary 
production, however, reveals a different story, one that is again powerfully told by the 
latest English translation of his Das Recht der Gesellschaft. 
Luhmann’s work appeared in English translation considerably early, but was 
accompanied by nothing as vivid a discussion of his work as there has been in 
Germany. After the first English translation of his small book, Vertrauen (1979a), his 
important books from the 1960s and 1970s found their way into the English-speaking world 
at best indirectly, through their Spanish, Italian, or Japanese translations perhaps, but 
not through the availability of English translations. This changed in 1985 with the 
publication by Routledge of an English version of Luhmann’s Rechtssoziologie (A 
Sociological Theory of Law), originally published in German in 1972. While translations 
of his writings, in rapid succession, appeared in Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, 
and even Serbo-Croat, English translations remained scarce. Another considerably 
isolated English translation of his Macht was published by Wiley in 1979. The subsequent 
publication of his outstanding essays in (altogether) six volumes of Soziologische 
Aufklärung and his four volumes of Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik startlingly failed to 
arouse any English publisher’s interest, while these essays that are rightly considered to 
contain the central gist of Luhmann’s thinking were greeted with sustained enthusiasm 
in Italy and in Japan. The 1980s and 1990s, then, saw English translations of his related, 
 
exquisite study, Liebe als Passion (1986), and of his magnus opus, Soziale Systeme (1995). Two 
happy incidents of timely translation are those of Luhmann’s intriguing study, 
Ökologische Kommunikation (1989), and of his formidable study of welfare politics and 
the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat (1990), 
while the 1988 major study that would inaugurate Luhmann’s individualized 
explorations of singular social systems beginning with the economy, his Die Wirtschaft 
der Gesellschaft (1988) is lost to the English language world. The same fate seemed to be 
reserved for the ensuing studies in this programme, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993), 
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (1995), culminating in the 1997 volume, Die Gesellschaft der 
Gesellschaft, and the posthumously published volumes, Die Politik der Gesellschaft 
(2000), and Die Religion der Gesellschaft (2000). Laudable exceptions are the early 
availability of the English texts of Soziologie des Risikos (1993) and of Die Realität der 
Massenmedien (2000). 
It is against this background that in 2004 a brilliant English translation of Niklas 
Luhmann’s major treatise on legal theory, Das Recht der Gesellschaft was (finally) 
published, accompanied by a comprehensive introduction written by Richard Nobles and 
David Schiff, both experts on jurisprudence in general and on Luhmann in particular. 
The English edition of the complex and densely argued volume has been prepared by the 
translator, Klaus Ziegert, Nobles and Schiff, Fatima Kastner and Rosamund Ziegert. 
With 11 years since the publication of the book in German, Law as a Social System meets a 
somewhat changed theoretical and political situation of thinking about law. While, in 
1993 in Germany, Luhmann’s book was understood by many as the major counter-
project to Habermas’s Facts and Norms (1996), the discussion that dominated German 
discussions in the 1990s has since moved on. With Habermas’s extension of his theory of 
discursive ethics to the rule of law and parliamentary democracy, to the welfare state and 
 
private law theory, culminating in a farreaching concept of proceduralized law, Luhmann’s 
book did indeed seem like a stern counter-proposal, negating the direct determination of 
law by political or, even less, moral concerns, while affirming law’s ‘irritability’ to 
conditions in its environment. In contrast to Habermas’s passionate belief in the capacity 
of a fragmented, highly diversified civil society to create conditions of mutual 
recognition and democratic deliberation, Luhmann’s work has regularly been received as 
much more dispassionate, even a-passionate with regard to normative claims offered about 
the miracles that law was meant to achieve in bringing about a just society. A striking 
coup d’œil of these alternative approaches to law is given in Luhmann’s exquisite 
review of Habermas’s treatise (see Luhmann 1998). In it, Luhmann famously suggests that 
had Habermas regarded the place of law within society with a greater sense of irony, his 
theory would not have spelled out so great a demand (and, indeed, hope) for an integrative 
function of the law. 
Today, Luhmann’s major treatise of legal theory is likely to unfold in the contemporary 
climate of the separating-out of the legal and the political. The thesis of law’s autonomy as 
a social system, its autopoietic reproduction in a conflict-ridden domain and in co-existence 
to other social systems, such as politics, economy and religion, is likely to be even more 
provocative in times of law’s besieging by the sword-clinging armies of anti-terrorism 
warfare and hegemonic politics (see Koskenniemi, 2002; Paulus, 2004; Krisch, 2005). 
And yet, the long overdue, posthumous publication – Luhmann died in 1998 – of the 
English text gives clear testimony of Luhmann’s uncompromising sensitivity to the very 
challenges that law is facing – then and today. Luhmann’s legal theory is a highly 
sophisticated study of the conditions that must be present if any communicative meaning 
is to survive from the battlefield of contemporary conflict into tomorrow’s search for 
stability and memory. Law can fulfil this stabilizing function – despite, or should we say 
 
because of its relative autonomy from the rule-production that is otherwise taking place 
within the parameters of economic exchange or political discourse. Law’s reproduction of 
meaning consists of capturing a specific, timely understanding of ‘legal’ as differentiated 
from ‘illegal’, without, however, allowing a larger societal discourse to set, shape and 
further define this meaning and distinction of legal/illegal – against the tides of 
domestic and international conflict. Instead, law – through an ‘introversion’ of sorts – 
develops rules and norms informed by yesterday’s definition and assignment of 
legal/illegal, that will serve as guiding post and reminder when applied to conflict 
situations tomorrow. In a paradoxical combination of vulnerability and sovereignty for 
the decision over the concrete case, the law relies on rules that it has developed through 
repeated application in previous cases and it is through this application today that 
the law constantly refines and improves its sensitivity to each new and different 
situation awaiting regulation. 
As always, Luhmann’s language, here in a faithful English translation, is 
straightforward and matter-of-fact in stating what – in his eyes – ought to be seen as the 
basis for understanding contemporary societies. It is only against the background of this 
understanding of the particular role of law, that its function can be grasped. Building on 
his groundbreaking theory that understands society as the co-existence and complex 
inter-action (‘co-evolution’) of different systems of societal production that he laid out in 
his 1984 work, Soziale Systeme, Luhmann posits the law as one of society’s social 
systems, that is, one of the building elements of Luhmann’s description of society as a 
whole. Law, however, presents itself as a special case in the concert of social systems 
constituting society. The reason for the difficulty of identifying law as a social system as 
alongside those of the economy, art, religion or politics, is that law seemingly permeates 
all layers, spheres or, ‘systems’ of society. Luhmann says that law as a social system 
 
performs society, it does so ‘with each of its operations by reproducing communication 
and delineating it against everything else. But it instantiates its own autopoiesis, the 
autopoiesis of the legal system, by following the legal coding rather than any other coding 
or even no coding at all’ (p. 467). In light of this description it is obvious that law’s 
confinement to the logics of a system’s autopoietic reproduction arouses resistance. 
Luhmann is certainly aware of this and he carefully traces the origins and, in his view, 
at least partially misleading assumptions that support the traditional positioning of legal 
thinking. As is true of his masterful, early treatise in the Sociology of Law (1972), 
Luhmann’s Law as a Social System explores the very possibility of law. Rather than 
engaging in searches for law’s essence or its otherwise eternal inner nature, Luhmann 
is interested in the ways in which we can see law perform its particular function. In the 
search for identifying the function of law it becomes clear that what is at stake is the 
recognition of the boundaries of law. With a view to what is inside, we gain a view on 
what is outside – seen from the inside, through the lenses only there available. Luhmann 
distinguishes law’s performance from its function: while law’s performance must be seen, 
first of all, in the resolution of disputes and, building on this, in the steering of human 
behaviour, law nonetheless has no exclusive mandate to do so. With other mechanisms 
available for resolving conflicts and for shaping human conduct, law cannot be defined 
exclusively through its performance. It is instead through its function that we can begin 
to understand the unique quality of law. 
In Luhmann’s theory, law serves primarily to stabilize expectations. It does so by 
producing rules that preserve the identification of something as ‘legal’ over time and that 
therefore are available for an assessment at a later point in time. The time-binding quality of 
law is thus the basis and the core of Luhmann’s legal theory and it is here that many 
commentators miss an outspoken commitment to a normative framework, a certain 
 
political or ethical model of social order. In Luhmann’s view, the law cannot offer such a 
model, or programme. Instead, it ‘reacts’ to normative or other demands, irritations, from 
outside its systematic frame of reference, by reacting to changes in its own mode. The 
legal system does not react to the world outside, it reacts to challenges from inside 
that result from the way in which the law deals with a new case. At first sight, this must 
seem to stand at odds with the view that identifies the law as never having been 
anything but a formidable weapon in the hands of the powerful in the first place. 
When Luhmann insists that there is ‘no transfer of information from the environment 
to the system’ (p. 468), this must rightly disturb those who wish to shape the legal 
system on the basis of political demands and ethical programmes. Yet Luhmann makes 
clear that the law is not blind to what is going on outside of it. Instead, ‘[t]he social 
relevance of law is indisputable. However, its integrative function is very much in doubt. 
This has been pointed out time and again by, above all, the critical legal studies 
movement and by other critics inspired by Marx.’ ‘We can avoid’, Luhmann goes on, ‘this 
controversy by moving the problem to the temporal dimension. We see the social meaning 
of law in the fact that there are social consequences if expectations can be secured as stable 
expectations over time’ (p. 143). Later, we read: ‘Abstractly, law deals with the social 
costs of the time binding of expectations. Concretely, law deals with the function of the 
stabilization of the normative expectations by regulating how they are generalized in 
relation to their temporal, factual, and social dimensions’ (pp. 147–8). 
In the middle chapters of the book, this inside/outside perspective is further laid out. 
The ‘Evolution of Law’ (Chapter 6) is characterized by the emergence of an internal, 
self-referential system of rules, legal doctrine (Rechtsdogmatik) and the increasing 
supremacy of courts over the executive and, later, the parliament (Chapter 7), in speaking 
out what the law is. This is exemplified by the emergence of the constitution as (in 
 
Luhmann’s words) an ‘evolutionary achievement’ (Luhmann, 1989). A constitution puts 
on paper that which has always been and will for the time to come be the virtual 
consensus on what the law is. The courts are asked to interpret the constitution, aware 
of the interpreted text embodying the law as it exists in its intricate relationship to the 
system of politics to which it is structurally coupled through the constitution. 
‘Writing’, Luhmann notes, ‘operates with the advantage that it keeps knowledge 
readily available for unexpected, optional access’ (p. 234). This is further developed in the 
eminently important Chapter 10 that illuminates the concept of ‘structural 
couplings’. Besides the constitution, other examples of such ‘couplings’ include 
contract and property. They occupy specific places within the emerging framework of legal 
doctrine, and thus have an internal role in the evolution of the legal system while, externally, 
they carry out a central function for the development of the economy. They operate inside of 
each system but have an internally different performance in each. 
While property as an economic term does have the value of ownership attached to it 
while lacking the capacity of determining ownership, in the legal system, property reflects 
the determination of ownership without attaching a more general value to it. This is 
certainly a problematic demarcation, and Luhmann is well aware of its problems. 
Earlier, he rejected the reductionist perspectives of the legal theory of the ‘economic 
analysis of law’, aka ‘law and economics’, which he dismisses on the premise that its 
protagonists too restrictively identify economic motives as the driving forces of the legal 
system. In contrast, Luhmann underlines the quality of the legal system as able to carry 
out its function in a highly differentiated, fragmented society, finding application in poly-
contextual domains that constantly expose the limits and boundaries of law. Law, then, re-
adjusts its borders to these fast-changing, dynamic contexts by further refining its 
instrumental apparatus. 
 
We are reminded of the painful conversations between Chekhov’s (1985) Mrs 
Ranyevskajya, the dramatically impoverished landlord of an old cherry orchard, and the 
self-made entrepreneur, Lopahin, about breaking up the otherwise doomed estate into 
separate entities for lease. While the former clearly hears the message that this move 
would ‘save’ her, the business proposition remains entirely at odds with a worldview 
in which the orchard reflects former, more fortunate times, captured by Chekhov’s 
brilliant exposition of the drama of what Karl Polanyi (1944) has described as the 
devastating effects of the emerging market society. The separate worlds that are reflected in 
her respective utterances in this eventually futile conversation about saving the estate, 
mark the challenge in the face of which the law constantly operates. One should not for a 
minute underestimate Luhmann’s awareness of this world. In defence of the apparently 
austere and consequentialist style in which he defines legal theory as being about the 
boundaries of law, one might only point to the many parts in his work where he sincerely 
questions the very possibility of law’s carrying out this function, described by him as no 
less than the preservation of meaning over time, of the stabilization of expectations of 
what the law is and what it is not. 
The above-indicated tensions unfold fully in his concluding chapter, ‘Society and Its 
Law’, where we find a gripping and chilling account of law in times of globalization. This 
chapter is well worth distributing in advanced university courses on the prospects of the 
rule of law in an era of dramatic denationalization, deterritorialized commerce, war and 
transnational societal disintegration. In light of the increasingly questionable ability of 
the nation-state to define the limits and framework for the economy, science and other 
spheres of society, its ability to preserve a ‘national’ legal system is in danger as well. 
By raising the question of how the law might at all be able to still function outside the 
confines of the nation-state, with regard to internal, ethnic conflicts, the challenges of 
 
multiparty, post-conflict, nation-building (Markovits, 2001; Gross, 2004), or, international 
environmental (Ellis, 2006), security (Anderson, 2004) or legitimacy (Perez, 2003; Chander, 
2005) concerns, Luhmann puts the finger on the wound of the increasingly ailing and 
beaten body of law. His treatise lays out in excruciating detail the very fragility and 
vulnerability of law. Indeed, Luhmann concedes the manifold conditions of 
embeddedness of the fine-lined, multi-polar body of the legal system. In recognizing that 
the law has been able to carry out its function over time, he admits that much of this is likely 
to have been owed to the institutionalization of relatively stable political conditions. All 
this is in danger today from many sides. Law’s increasing fragmentation due to a 
constantly growing number of norm-producing entities, each with contestable claims to 
identity, recognition and enforcement, as well as its growing competition with other 
social systems akin to the law (Teubner, 1997; Calliess, 2002; Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner, 2004), creates nothing less than dramatic and, perhaps, apocalyptic challenges to 
law. 
Robert Kagan’s (2003) brutalizing indictment of Europe’s ‘paradise of law’ and 
deliberation in contrast to the United States’ ‘jungle of danger and decision-taking’, could 
very well exemplify Luhmann’s concluding skepsis that what he described as the legal 
system might, after all, not have been much more than an ‘European anomaly, which 
might well level off with the evolution of global society’ (p. 490). Without further 
exploring the emergence of concepts such as transnational law (Jessup, 1956; 
Zumbansen, 2002, 2006) or post-national constitutionalism (Tully, 1995), Luhmann’s 
text, 11 years after its original publication, exhibits an extraordinary awareness of the 
central challenges of law in the world society. Citing his eminent article of 1970 (!), 
entitled ‘The World Society’, Luhmann argues that society, today, can only mean world 
society, a decentred, deterritorialized sphere of human activity. It is against this 
 
background, that not merely the role, but in fact the very possibility of law must be 
reassessed. Just one striking piece of evidence of Luhmann’s acute awareness of law’s 
crucial function in the transnationalization of human rights claims, is his laconic mention 
of the Alvarez-Machain litigation, one that has, in the meantime, found a dramatic end in 
the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision not to recognize the US American Alien Tort Statute 
(of 1789) as a basis for suing for a human rights violation initiated by US officials on 
foreign soil (In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 2004; Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 2004). 
Law in the world society will be determined by its internal reaction to the challenges 
brought about by the conflicts that Luhmann already in 1981 in Political Theory in the 
Welfare State aptly identified as bearing the prime responsibility for the assignment of 
actual rights and entitlements, that is the dynamic between inclusion and exclusion. 
Identifying exclusion as the distinctive mechanism that determines whether or not 
individuals will have access to legal decision-making is rendered more dramatic by the 
amplificatory qualification whereby initial degrees of societal exclusion will likely 
result in further exclusion. Being excluded from one social system (no passport) will 
likely further the exclusion from other systems (marriage, housing, education, extended 
social welfare). In turn, this might reinforce desperate action, deviance, crime, in short, 
illegality. But, maybe legality might no longer mean a safe haven. Seemingly echoing 
Foucault’s last chapter of the History of Sexuality (Part I), where he unfolds the concept 
of bio politics and the naked body, and even, perhaps, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, 
Luhmann writes, ‘There is nothing to lose in the highly integrated area of exclusion, 
apart from control over one’s own body’ (p. 490; see also Neves, 2001). 
That there is much to lose, is well documented by such a densely argued exposition of 
law as a social system whose primary function is to provide for a form of societal 
memory with which meanings of legality are made identifiable, to remind, to haunt, to 
 
inspire us. The contemporary debates over the legality of humanitarian intervention 
(Koskenniemi, 2002), over the permissibility of torture (Ignatieff, 2004; Taylor, 2005), of 
pre-emptive warfare in the name of national security – all of them constitute dangerous 
games with the state of exception, omnipresent in Schmitt’s metaphor. It has rightly 
been remarked that the current crisis of international law is a crisis of law per se 
(Koskenniemi, 2005; Anghie, 2005). Likewise, Luhmann’s observation that today’s society 
is the world society, makes pertinent the question, ‘Which law for the world society?’ 
From a governance perspective, many problems of the world society can in many 
ways be seen as amplifications or dramatizations of developments that began in the 
disintegration of increasingly heterarchic national legal and political orders, hence the 
emerging awareness of the need of a bordertranscending administrative law (Aman, 
1997; Krisch et al., 2005). At the same time, while the emergence of new actors and new 
forms of norm production render the application of our nation-state toolkit redundant 
and the memory of international law’s normative utopia ever more existential 
(Koselleck, 1979; Zumbansen 2001a, 2001b), our task, time and again, will be to reassess 
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